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Approaching Heidegger’s History of Being through the Black 
Notebooks 
Abstract:  
The aim of this essay is to explore the importance of the Black Notebooks (GA 
94-99) beyond their contribution to Heidegger’s political biography. While 
attention has up to now focused almost exclusively on other matters, the Black 
Notebooks offer new perspectives on Heidegger’s writings from the 1930s and 
1940s, and beyond. The essay argues, that any reading of Heidegger’s later work 
that tries to ignore the question for the History of Being, that is, the essential 
development of his work, as it moves from a consideration of the Meaning of Being 
to the History of Being, is doomed to misunderstand the essentially historical 
reflection of Heidegger’s thought. Therefore, if one wants to mobilise 
Heidegger’s thinking as a response to the great questions of our age, which this 
essay identifies as those of Global Warming, Globalisation, Nihilism and the 
Nightmare of the Manipulated Human Being, the latter raised by Merleau-Ponty in 
Eye and Mind, then one needs to force the question of history in his work as the 
central problem underlying any future potentiality of its philosophical impact. 
Key Words: Heidegger, Black Notebooks, History of Being, Globalization, Global 
Warming, Nihilism.  
 
 
Following the publication of the Contributions to Philosophy, Mindfulness and 
the History of Being, the question of the significance of Heidegger’s later work has 
been widely discussed. However, the manifold difficulties raised by this Turning 
from the Question of the Meaning of Being to the Question of the History of Being, has 
led many philosophers to condemn the obscurity of these later works, 
particularly in contrast to the clarity of Being and Time. And yet, insofar as 
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Heidegger’s later philosophy attempts to make our contemporary world 
question-worthy in an essential sense, it belongs with the most significant 
thought philosophy currently has to offer.  
    The aim of this contribution is to explore the importance of the Black Notebooks 
(GA 94-99) beyond their contribution to Heidegger’s political biography. While 
attention has up to now focused almost exclusively on other matters, the Black 
Notebooks offer new perspectives on Heidegger’s writings from the 1930s and 
1940s, and beyond. They do so from various angles, including reflections on 
metaphysics, on the essence of politics as much as on the political situation of the 
time, on the main authors that Heidegger worked on during these years, on 
aesthetics, on his personal position in Germany during and after the Second 
World war, as well as on the works he had already published.     In other words, 
for anyone trying to understand, evaluate and transform Heidegger’s later 
thinking, to see where and how he moves beyond the parameters of the historico-
transcendental tradition of the 19th century, these volumes offer immeasurable 
wealth.  
In the following, I will attempt to defend this rather high expectation, namely 
that our studies of the Black Notebooks, rather than in Trawny’s judgement giving 
us “entirely plausible reasons to break off every interest in Heidegger’s 
philosophy”1, might instead throw some light on some of what I called above the 
most significant thought philosophy currently has to offer”. 
What would such thought have to offer? What are the most significant 
problems humanity currently faces?  
 Global Warming – and therefore the destruction not only of the human 
world, but the mass-extinction of life in a planetary disaster.  
 Globalization – the growing feeling that the human being is losing its 
‘home’, its world, that the more the human subject has become a 
 
1 Trawny, “Thinking Time”, p. 74.  
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globalized phenomenon, the more isolated it becomes in its pure 
particularity. Consequently, the contemporary rise of the far-right on 
the fertile soil of fear.  
 Nietzsche’s Nihilism – the destruction of the essentially political nature 
of the human being in the sense of breeding itself, in favour of a 
biological technologization of the human being as the ‘finally fixed 
animal’; and, following on from here,  
 Merleau-Ponty’s Nightmare from which there is no awakening – the 
fear that once the human being is drawn into the net of its own 
machinations, it will truly become the pure manipulandum that it thinks 
itself to be2.  
The question is, does Heidegger’s later philosophy address these questions in 
a meaningful way, and, particularly, what is the impact of the Black Notebooks on 
the way that we can raise these questions? If we look at them briefly again:  
Global Warming 
From the 1960s onwards, Heidegger’s meditation on the essence of 
technology has been an important resource for environmental thinking. 
And yet, something has changed since the 1970s and 1980s. This regards 
not that much different developments of climate science, but the clear 
feeling that our time is even more limited than we might have feared. 
Philosophy has always had a long incubation time, it never lent itself to 
quick fixes. As Heidegger says in a maybe too dramatic tone: “Only those 
who have the courage and the knowledge to think across the next three 
 
2 Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind”, p. 122. As this is a rather central passage of this work, I am 
going to quote it here in full: « Si ce genre de pensée prend en charge l’homme et l’histoire, et si, 
feignant d’ignorer ce que nous en savons par contact et par position, elle entreprend de les 
construire à partir de quelques indices abstraits, … , puisque l’homme devient vraiment le 
manipulandum qu’il pense être, on entre dans un régime de culture où il n’y a plus ni vrai ni faux 
touchant l’homme et l’histoire, dans un sommeil ou un cauchemar dont rien ne saurait le 
réveiller ».  
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hundred years, are able today to join into thinking and to engage with 
‘philosophy’”3 – but as we know today, we might not have another three 
hundred years and in this respect, completely independent of Heidegger’s 
thinking, philosophy is under threat from Global Warming. Philosophy 
has never been a subject with immediate impact, but the Overcoming of 
Metaphysics might take more time than we have, while, as one says, we 
need to act today. So, can Gelassenheit be understood as Heidegger’s 
attempt to accelerate the advent of another thinking?  
But that might essentially be the problem: ‘What is action?’, ‘What is 
agency?’ and, ‘what is subjectivity?’ The problem for my generation was 
that many of us came into philosophy from out of a feeling of 
disappointment with the political development of our European cultures. 
Somehow there was the idea that one needed to step back, to meditate 
fundamentally about the ’truth of the world’, in order then to return again 
to subjective action. But maybe the whole idea of thinking properly first, in 
order then to direct one’s action lies at the heart of the problem. It is this 
Hegelian conviction of the force of subjectivity that Heidegger’s Being and 
Time had begun to undermine and that is further deconstructed in 
Heidegger’s later work, ending in the famous phrase that ‘only a god can 
save us now’4. And yet, as we will see, there are many points of contact 
between Hegel’s and Heidegger’s meditations on historial philosophy and 
once that we move from the ‘middle’ of the Black Notebooks onwards, Hegel 
and Nietzsche become more and more the main interlocutors of his 
writings, often no longer in the explicit form of a critical disengagement 
(Auseinandersetzung), but as taking their reflections to be expressions of the 
truth of our world5. In the end, the reversal of the relation of technology to 
 
3 Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen XII-XV, p. 176f, my translation.  
4 Martin Heidegger, „Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger“, in: Reden und andere Zeugnisse, 
pp. 652-683.  
5 Precisely because it is quite evident that Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzungen with Nietzsche, 
Hölderlin, Hegel, etc. have never been intended to be mere interpretations of philosophical 
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science, similarly to Hegel’s thought, implies that we are acting before we 
are thinking, which means that thought does not suffice to change our 
actions. And here we also find one of Hegel’s judgments at the root of 
Heidegger’s thought, namely that ‘language is more truthful than what we 
mean to say’. Here we can also find the fundamental difficulty of thinking 
in the face of the insight that history has become the sole content of 
philosophy. While I will come back to this topic towards the end of this 
paper, the problem arising here is whether the Question for the History of 
Being, especially as it is developed in the Black Notebooks, can inform our 
understanding of ‘that which moves the world’ in the destiny of our being. 
Globalization 
From early on, Heidegger rephrases the question of the Nietzschean 
horizon, necessary for any animal to live, as the question of historial space, 
while the problem of globalization is addressed by the notion of global 
enframing and its concurrent Ent-Fernung or ‘de-distantification’, that is, 
the progressive disappearance of distance in the process of the world 
becoming a homogenised and, therefore, unhistorical space. Once all the 
people of this earth come together in ‘international mindedness’ and 
internationalization: are we really going to enter a golden age of peace or 
are we at risk to lose ourselves?  
This problem has maybe given rise to the most essential ‘unhappiness’ with 
Heidegger’s philosophy, as it seems to go against the grain of the post-war 
consensus, namely that it is only globalization that can achieve universal 
peace and prosperity. It is even more fundamentally put into question 
 
doctrine, but were always an attempt of allowing us to take a step back towards a proper Wahr-
nehmung, that is, perception of our experience, this shift is quite significant, especially in terms of 
understanding Heidegger’s hermeneutics. In other words, the critique of Nietzsche of the late 
1930s and early 1940s is always and essentially a critique of the present. In this respect, the 
Auseinandersetzungen with these authors is, at the same time, the Aueinandersetzung with 
metaphysics, as it is to be found in the Contributions, Mindfulness, The History of Beyng, etc.  
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today, where Eurocentrism in philosophy is problematized and the 
‘decolonialized curriculum’ made obligatory, on account of the conviction 
that only a globalized thinking is able to bring about universal moral 
justice.  
Originally, the confrontation with Heidegger was kept in relatively civil 
terms, that of a ‘reactionary peasant philosophy’ against an enlightened, 
‘progressive city-dweller philosophy’ (which we may nowadays call the 
‘liberal-elite philosophy’). Heidegger’s consistent identification of thinking 
as the handicraft of the farmer sounds abhorrent in the ears of the city-
dwellers who conceive of thinking as the hard, conceptual labour of 
intellectuals, who master the abstract constructions of representational 
systems, finally demonstrating their mastery by taking a defined position, 
some -ism that they then throw against all other -isms. And, thus, the 
language became much harsher, when Heidegger’s critique of 
globalization was identified with Nazi Blut und Boden ideology and finally 
with ‘Being-Historical anti-Semitism’6. It seems to me that the immediate 
identification of Heidegger’s thinking as reactionary and resentful as much 
as the condemnation of his political engagement all stem from an ignorance 
or denial of the essentially historial dimension of philosophical thinking, a 
denial which is aggravated by the ethically motivated problematization of 
‘Eurocentrism’, which implies a certain idea of philosophical thinking, 
namely its logical, computational and abstract nature, independent of any 
given space and time, that is, a metaphysical thinking that is essentially 
ahistorical.  
 
6 The initial reception of the Black Notebooks has been essentially informed by their editor, Peter 
Trawny, who coined the term ‘Being-Historical anti-Semitism’, or, slightly less awkward, 
‘Seinsgeschichtlicher Anti-Semitismus’. See: A. J. Mitchell and P. Trawny, eds., Heidegger’s Black 
Notebooks: Responses to Anti-Semitism. For the Blut und Boden ideology, see the most extreme, if 
unphilosophical response to Heidegger’s work by Emmanuel Faye, for example: Heidegger, 
L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. See also the rather violent critique of this 
interpretation of the Black Notebooks by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in: Herrmann & Alfieri, 
Martin Heidegger – Die Wahrheit über die Schwarzen Hefte.  
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It is, again, quite true that Heidegger’s thinking constantly goes back to an 
idea of thinking as das Bauen des Bauers – the building of the farmer7, but the 
question might be, is such thinking necessarily reactionary in opposition to 
the progressive thinking of the city dweller? Is this because the modern 
organisation of life in mega-cities has come later in historical time and that 
there is no future for the farmer? Is Geschichte to be interpreted from such 
a simple before and after, backwards and forwards? This is certainly the 
perspective of Heidegger’s critique of globalization. In an essay called The 
Field Path, Heidegger says 
The human being attempts in vain to bring order to the globe by means of 
its planning, as long as it does not remain integrated into the saying of the 
field path. The contemporary human being runs the risk of remaining deaf 
to its language. All that falls into their ears is the racket of machines, which 
they take for the voice of God.8  
It is at least worth considering whether there is some point here about the 
claim, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s critique of the Last Men, that the 
globalized world is a world without history and therefore a world without 
future, and therefore a thought that is essentially not progressive. I am aware 
that it is not sufficient to draw attention to Heidegger’s claim that the 
present has to be thought from the future, but maybe, illuminating that 
what he calls ‘the fear of thinking’ comes back to a ‘fear of the historial 
depth of thinking’ and its consequent realization, that existence cannot be 
mastered by abstract rationality and that the philosopher is not the master 
of some ‘meta-ethics’ or even ‘meta-philosophy’. This emptying out of any 
horizon seems to me to lie at the root of a lot of misunderstanding, for 
example, when Günther Figal claims that Heidegger’s ‘idea’ of another 
thinking is ‘trans-philosophical’9, that is, that the idea that Another Thinking 
 
7 This might sound strange in English, while the German refers to the Anbauen, i.e., to grow, 
to cultivate and the bestellen des Landes, i.e., to crop, to cultivate.  
8 Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, p 89, my translation. 
9 Günther Figal, „Clearing and Space”, p. 285.  
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would be even more universal and even more globalized than even 
European Metaphysics.  
True, to consider these questions is unpleasant – especially as these arose 
in rather ‘unpleasant’ times – but who did ever say that philosophy should 
be pleasant? As Heidegger quotes Hegel’s introduction to the 
Phenomenology: “philosophy hast to be careful to avoid trying to be 
edifying”10. And to claim some point of decision in moral philosophy, 
which would rule out the philosophical value of thought by means of an 
‘ethics test’ – as we nowadays have them at university and everywhere – is 
essentially unphilosophical. Neither can one just sort philosophical 
insights into those which are more or less ‘problematic’, as if one could 
avoid philosophical problems according to the ‘trolley problem’: that is, 
choosing at each crossroad which path is, as Günther Figal asks when 
correcting Heidegger’s ideas, ‘less problematic’11, before one even starts to 
think along the path ‘chosen’. Another metaphor often used here to 
describe the task of the philosophical commentator is that of ‘weeding out 
the bad bits’. And yet, it is, in any case, the task of philosophy to think that 
which is, rather than just thinking about something that is not, just because 
it would make us feel better (cf. GA 97/156).  
In any case, the problem of ‘Globalization’, which implies for Heidegger 
the question of nations and people, of such strange concepts like Russentum 
or Deutschtum, or even of the ‘Jewish people’, is thought through the 
question for the history of being, this question which most commentators 
of Heidegger seem to either misunderstand, expressly rebuke or even 
completely ignore. The task is to think from the position of history towards 
that bedrock of philosophical Da-sein, which individuates the latter. This 
individuation in the historical embodied life will indeed throw up many 
 
10 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I-V, p. 310: „Die Philosophie aber muß sich hüten, erbaulich 
seyn zu wollen“ (my translation).  
11 See Figal, op cit., p. 285.  
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problems that we have tried to escape from, in, for example, the city-
dwellers’ Habermasianism. And, yes, maybe it is ironic if one tries to find 
in Heidegger some help against the contemporary rise of the far right, 
though he certainly provided a sustained critique of Nazi ideology in the 
notebooks from the 1930s to the 1940s, which often rings true even today. 
In the following, after a brief view at ‘Nihilism’ and ‘Nightmare’, I will, 
therefore, make a first attempt to defend Heidegger’s question for the 
history of being.  
Nihilism 
As everyone nowadays knows, while Heidegger was always a 
‘Nietzschean’, while Being and Time did not need to mention Nietzsche very 
often, as it was still happily walking alongside him, Heidegger’s later 
thought particularly depended on his Seinsgeschichtliche Auseinander-
setzung (not so well translated as historico-critical dis-engagement) with 
Nietzsche. This is reflected in the famous remark that ‘Nietzsche has ruined 
me’12. Where Nietzsche was calling for someone who would be able to 
‘make all my truths unbelievable’13, and where Heidegger was the first 
sincerely to respond to that call, he seems to have judged himself that he 
did not manage to make all, if any, of Nietzsche’s truths unbelievable. And 
yet, if the Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche was to be successful, this is 
precisely what it would have needed. The Black Notebooks, therefore, 
engage with this attempt constantly, again and again reflecting on the 
relation between ‘last men’ and modernity, between the ‘downfall’ of the 
 
12 This remark, “Nietzsche hat mich kaputt gemacht”, attributed to Heidegger in a story told 
by Hans-Georg Gadamer, might, therefore, only arise from hearsay, but has nonetheless a 
revelatory power with respect to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. See also: Ullrich Haase, “Dike 
and iustitia, or: Between Heidegger and Nietzsche”. 
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Letter to Overbeck, 2nd of July 1885, in: “Briefe”, KSB 610 7/63, 1885; 
“My life now consists of the desire that all things may be different from how I understand them; 
and that someone will make my ‘truths’ unbelievable”, my translation. 
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‘higher men’ and the ‘overcoming of metaphysics’, therefore the question 
of the ‘not yet fixed animal’ and the Overhuman, on the one hand, and the 
‘insertion into Da-Sein’ (Einsprung in das Da-sein) on the other. The question 
for the history of being is therefore, not very surprisingly, constantly 
developed on the background of Nietzsche’s questioning of history and the 
achievements of other thinkers are throughout measured against 
Nietzsche’s thought. And yet, as I mentioned above with respect to Hegel, 
in the Black Notebooks, especially from GA 97 onwards, he speaks of these 
no longer as ‘words of Nietzsche’, but as ‘words of our world’. Of 
Spengler’s Decline of the West, Heidegger thus says that it “hardly manages 
to reach the threshold of the Overhuman” (GA 97/367).  
But this will introduce another problem, namely that of the ‘body’, which 
Nietzsche describes as the mediated truth of history, this “human body, in 
which the whole of the farthest and nearest past of all organic becoming 
reawakens and becomes body, through which and beyond which an 
enormous but inaudible stream seems to flow”14. This body will throw up 
all these problems again, from space and place to ‘metaphysical anti-
Semitism’. This body, of which Heidegger has constantly affirmed that it is 
too difficult to talk about, insofar as the question of the history of being 
ventures to understand the ‘body’, the leibende Leben, without recourse to 
any objectification through either ‘life’ or ‘mathematical space’. What 
happens to the leibende Leben, the embodied life, once we have to 
understand place and time “in terms of their relation to history and to 
human beings as historical”, as Heidegger asks in the lecture course 
Hölderlin’s Hymne ‘Der Ister’15? Or, again in other words, what happens to 
the thinking of the human body as soon as we are forced to leave the age-
old attempt to understand the human being as an ‘Animal + Something’? 
 
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, KSA 11/565, my translation. 
15 Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister“, p. 65. 
 Approaching Heidegger’s History of  Being 11 
As Nietzsche says, “our experience of space and time leads us into error”16 
– and it seems to me that the reflection on the history of being aims exactly 
at that experience as the fundamental question of phenomenology.  
The question of the history of being therefore demands the radical 
decoupling of Da-sein from the concept of an objectified ‘animality’, 
already because these cannot appear on the same plane of thinking. To 
understand this question of history in the context of the radicalized 
phenomenological stance of Heidegger demands the radical de-
objectification of the world and the de-representation of thinking, in such 
a way that the word ‘body’ itself becomes problematic. In this sense, we 
have to be aware that the question of Nihilism, as it develops from 
Nietzsche to later Heidegger, is neither thought psychologically nor 
epistemologically, but historico-ontologically.  
Nightmare 
At the beginning of Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty outlines the danger that 
arises from the ontological truth of the hermeneutic circle17. Following on 
from Nietzsche’s illumination of the Eternal Return of the Same as giving rise 
to the utmost importance of our thinking and our habits of thought for all 
that is to come18, Merleau-Ponty gives the most extreme account of the 
danger of technology: once we think about the human being as absolutely 
manipulatable, as a part of the Global Gestell, once we fail to make a 
 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 22; KSA 2/40; „Our sensations of space and 
time are false, for tested consistently they lead to logical contradictions“. One needs to listen 
carefully here: Nietzsche speaks of our ‘sensations’, our ‘Empfindungen’ of space and time, not 
about our ideas or conceptions of them.  
17 See the quotation from Eye and Mind above, as it claims that the way in which we interpret 
our existence threatens to become the truth of our existence.  
18 This is again a theme following from the idea of history in Nietzsche. See, especially, the 
‘illumination of the Eternal Recurrence’, in KSA 9/494: “The new heavyweight: the Eternal Return 
of the Same. The infinite importance of our knowledge, our errors, of our habits and ways of life 
for all that comes.” My translation. 
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difference between mining ore and mining the capacities of human beings 
in the form of their resource management, the human being will become 
the manipulandum that it thinks itself to be. In this respect, the human 
being, after about 2500 years of metaphysical thought, will have become 
the finally-fixed-animal, and as little as we would know how to turn 
‘animals’ into thinking beings, could we consider the possibility of the 
human being waking itself or being awoken, even by a God, from this 
nightmare. Contemporary philosophy, which mostly agrees with common 
sense in thinking that thinking does not really change much at all, cannot 
understand this problem and is therefore happily running ahead towards 
the abyss, in a frantic attempt, might this be in meta-ethics or neuro-
philosophy, to produce the final calculations that will save us from the 
ruination of technology, thereby being powered by what Heidegger calls 
the Not der Notlosigkeit. All that is left here is a negative feeling, a fear of the 
nothing which is the fear of thought.  
Heidegger rephrases this ‘nightmare’ in a more Nietzschean style in the 
Contributions, discussing the essence of technology: What is technology? 
“Is it the historial (geschichtliche) path to the end, to the falling back of the last 
man (des letzten Menschen) into the technicised animal, which thereby loses also 
the originary animality of the inserted animal, …?” (GA65/275). In other words, 
the question of technology is identical to the decision implied by the Eternal 
Return of the Same, namely that for either the ‘finally fixed animal’ or the 
Overhuman as the historial reality of the future, where Nietzsche equally 
calls this ‘finally fixed animal’ Untertierisch, that is, lower than animal life 
as conceived by us. Where Heidegger said in a letter to Medard Boss that 
there is some core resistance in the essence of the human being19, the Black 
 
19 See Martin Heidegger, Brief an Medard Boss, 29. Dezember 1967, in: Zollikoner Seminare, p. 
352. And yet, we need to be careful to interpret this in the sense of an ‚essential trait’ of the human 
being, which would be strange in the context of Heidegger’s reflections. Rather, as he says in: 
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 18: “Yet precisely because man is 
challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he 
never is transformed into a mere standing-reserve”.  
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Notebooks seem to be more on the side of Merleau-Ponty’s Nightmare, for 
example where they say that “maybe, though, in the middle of the 
suddenness of its turning, the event will keep to itself, so that everything 
petrifies into machination and that this petrified state pretends to be life”20. 
Following this explication, Heidegger discusses the absolute organization 
of the organ which we call the brain in Neuroscience, understood as the 
technological working out of its own foundation. The question thus is, in 
how far Heidegger’s critique of technology is intelligible only on account 
of the prior clarification of the question for the history of being.  
Is the Question for the History of Being ‘Plausible’? 
That Heidegger’s Black Notebooks can give us any help with the problems of 
Global Warming, Globalization, Nihilism and Nightmare is, according to many 
commentators, including Günther Figal, the former president of the Heidegger 
Society, not very plausible. Actually, the whole question for the history of being 
is, according to the latter, not very ‘plausible’. I am referring to the text already 
quoted above: “Clearing and Space: Thinking with Heidegger and Beyond”, a 
paper that can be used in a negatively heuristic way to try to make some general 
points about Heidegger’s thought as it moves from the Question of the Meaning of 
Being to the Question of the History of Being. Like many other commentators, Figal 
here tries to ‘weed out’ the thought of history in order to make ‘Heidegger’ more 
palatable. And, equally like many other commentators, he seems to ignore the 
point that, as Heidegger claims, the blindness to Geschichte is an essential sign of 
our contemporary fear of thinking as much as of the “decline of history in the so-
called beginning of world history in the sense of planetary operation”21. As one 
can easily see in the conclusion to Figal’s essay, without the Question for the 
History of Beyng, Heidegger’s thought becomes completely meaningless – and 
 
20 GA 97/308, my translation; “vielleicht auch hält das Ereignis mitten in der Jähe seiner Kehre 
an sich, so daß alles in die Machenschaft erstarrt und diese Starre sich als das Leben ausgibt”.  
21 Anmerkungen VI-IX, GA 98/42.  
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that includes the early ‘phase’ of Being and Time. One might say, we tend not so 
much to overlook the essential notion of Geschichte, we rather repress it. And that 
can be seen in many commentators on Heidegger, from (even) Gadamer, via 
Habermas to Figal and most in-between, often even where they make history an 
explicit topic of their interpretation. Considering this, we need to bear in mind, 
that, following Hegel, Heidegger is quite convinced that this is not due to a lack 
of consideration on account of these authors, as every author interprets from out 
of their experience and back towards it, in other words, that everyone always 
speaks the truth, but that we here gain an insight into that which is.  
What are these points of major ignorance? (I am trying to get this out of the 
way very quickly – as purely negative markers of what I will try to argue, linking 
that back to the four questions set out at the beginning: Global Warming, 
Globalization, Nihilism, Nightmare).  
1. The question of history: Figal seems to think of philosophy as a purely 
logical exercise of the mind, trying to make use of objective ideas in 
order to grasp objective fact: an idea of philosophy that really came to 
an end in 1807 and has been comprehensively buried by Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud. Figal consequently remains completely ignorant 
of Heidegger’s ‘path of thinking’ from Being and Time to his later 
philosophy. Every claim about the meaningfulness of Being and Time in 
opposition to the ‘obfuscation’ of the later works, just bears witness to 
the misunderstanding of ‘fundamental ontology’, which is, after all, 
itself an essentially historial path of thinking. In other words, it is not 
the case that Heidegger’s path of thinking enters the question of history 
in his later work. Without it, rather, the thought of Being and Time itself 
is unintelligible – precisely where it becomes just all too intelligible.  
2. The relation between ‘philosophy’ and the ‘sciences’: if all these are 
purely logical exercises of the mind, trying to grasp things, then we just 
have to see that there are different things to grasp for both of them, in 
order to conclude that “philosophy can walk alongside the sciences 
without competition” (p. 289). Though that would still require to have 
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an idea of the ‘object domain’ of philosophy, while again completely 
ignoring Heidegger’s thought of the idea of science as a tool of 
technology, a technology, whose essence is nothing technological, but 
itself geschickliche Geschichte. And yet, the presumed ‘ignorance of 
science’ on the part of Heidegger is one of the major points irking many 
of his commentators.  
3. Heidegger’s method of thinking: for that reason, Figal can see in ‘early 
Heidegger’ and ‘later Heidegger’ only two different ‘versions’ of a 
theoretical viewpoint, which can simply be compared with each other 
in view of their ‘plausibility’. Consequently, Figal’s reading of 
Heidegger compares early, middle and late in terms of the ‘plausibility’ 
of the ‘views’ expressed in each phase. Although the preface that 
Heidegger wrote to Richardson’s From Phenomenology to Thought has 
been available for a long while, not many commentators have taken the 
following remark seriously, where Heidegger says that:  
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and Heidegger II is justified 
only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of 
what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to be-thought 
by Heidegger II. But Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in 
Heidegger Il.22 
In other words, there is no Heidegger I and Heidegger II, lest one sees 
these as different moments of one method, of one path of thinking from 
the question of the meaning of being to that of the history of being. 
Figal’s next claim is, then, that in the middle of GA 97 – in a completely 
misunderstood phrase – Heidegger drops the idea of history and gives 
us the opportunity of thinking about space in the ‘view’ of a Lichtung 
(clearing) completely untouched by the topic of history. That would give 
us something ‘plausible’ to think – and something completely 
meaningless, reducing Heidegger’s writing to the clearing away of 
some clutter on the philosopher’s writing desk. Now one can say that 
 
22 William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. XXII. 
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Heidegger’s main contribution to philosophy was to think the clearing 
as the truth of space: and no longer does one have to worry about the 
question what all the trees are made of that surround that ‘clearing’.  
4. Therefore, the relation between ‘thinker’ and ‘thought’: one of the tasks 
of the ‘interpreter’, it seems, is to distinguish between ‘proper 
philosophical thoughts’, on the one hand, and resentment, prejudice 
and ideology, on the other. If one finds enough of the first, then 
Heidegger can be saved, by identifying his ‘disgraceful convictions’ 
and separating them from what is to be taken seriously. In this sense 
the interpreter’s task consists of weeding out the personal and 
ideological convictions and views, to see what pure philosophy is left, 
while already this idea of ‘pure philosophy’ is quite unphilosophical. 
One does therefore not really distinguish between the plausibility of the 
different views expressed in early, middle or late Heidegger, as any 
temporal sequence of the production of such thought is completely 
inconsequential with respect to their meaning as it is judged by the 
representing mind, which, furthermore, must already reside on a ‘meta-
philosophical’ level of truth, in order to separate clearly philosophical 
statements from ‘personal convictions’.  
To clarify these points a bit further:  
1. What we call one of the great thinkers, for example, those reflected on 
most in the Black Notebooks, that is, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hegel and 
Nietzsche or even Heidegger himself, never ‘change their minds’. Not 
because they are stubborn, but because for them thinking is not an 
abstract process of building a ‘view’ out of independently existing 
ideas. Instead these thinkers constantly have to defend the idea of 
thinking against this common sense ‘view’ of presenting ‘views’. The 
mind cannot change itself. Or, as Bataille puts it, to live is already to 
have given implicit answers to all the questions of philosophy, which 
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the ‘actual’ philosopher can only ‘work out’ after the fact23. If such a 
philosopher has an ‘illumination’, like Nietzsche’s ‘sudden’ insight into 
the thought of Eternal Recurrence in 1881 (see KSA 9/494) we readers 
can lead that thought back even to his early juvenilia. It is only after the 
fact, therefore, that Heidegger himself can discern different moments of 
the development of his thinking, like the ‘Destruction of Metaphysics’ 
in his early work, followed by the ‘historico-critical dis-engagement’ in 
his later work.  
2. Yet this is not to say that all philosophical thinking is ‘subjectively’ 
arising from an individual life. Rather, both Nietzsche and Heidegger 
describe the act of thinking as pathos, as a response to that which is. The 
famous Turning is thus not a change of Heidegger’s mind, but a change 
in that which elicits the response of thinking. And the relation that the 
thinker entertains with the past is not built on the choice of studying 
the texts of specific philosophers according to one’s liking, sorting 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ things. As Nietzsche says “when I speak of Plato 
Pascal Spinoza and Goethe, I know that their blood flows through 
mine” (KSA 9/585). This is what it means to speak about “the human 
body, in which the whole of the farthest and nearest past of all organic 
becoming reawakens and becomes body, through which and beyond 
which an enormous but inaudible stream seems to flow.”  It is maybe a 
sign of the most essential misunderstanding of Heidegger’s thought, if, 
like Daniela Valega-Neu, in The Bodily Dimension of Thinking, one 
decries the abstraction of Heidegger’s so called ‘grand historical 
schemes’ and counters them by a stress on small events, cashing in on 
the idea of a closeness to life against the grey destiny of history24. Here 
Valega-Neu denies any historical dimension to the question of the 
body, and goes on to identify in this dimension the shortcoming of 
Heidegger’s whole philosophy. And yet what Heidegger has in mind is 
 
23 Cf. Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 12. 
24 Daniela Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking, p. 83f.  
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not really a grand historical scheme, but more equivalent to Nietzsche’s 
dictum that the events that determine history come silently on doves’ 
feet25. The mistake here consists in presupposing that the notion of 
history opens up grand meta-narratives, rather than realizing that the 
question here concerns a concrete analysis of time, which, beyond 
idealist abstractions, has to be interpreted as historical.  
3. Is Heidegger first writing Being and Time, then entertaining the thought 
of history, finally giving it up again? Could he even? Following Hegel 
and Nietzsche, history has become the sole content of philosophy. Any 
‘eternal truth’ in philosophical thinking, as Being and Time has it, is 
merely a remnant of Christian theology26. The philosopher is therefore 
no longer looking at the world, developing ‘views’, as thinking is itself 
conceived of as a real part of that world thought. From here follows the 
necessary ‘erring’ of the philosopher, as Nietzsche has called it, and the 
Geschick der Geschichte, the destiny of history, as it is to be found in 
Heidegger. The fear of thinking is therefore the direct result of its 
historical depth insofar as this de-subjectivises the thinker herself. In a 
radicalization of Hegel’s statement that language is more truthful than 
our intentions that we try to express through it, Heidegger describes 
our mistake as thinking that we ‘have’ language, while in truth the 
word has us. And yet, to mention the obvious, a living language exists 
 
25 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, KSA 4/189, “Gedanken, die mit Taubenfüssen 
kommen, lenken die Welt”. And maybe it is for the same reason that we feel much more 
comfortable with, for example, Merleau-Ponty, even though he follows, as one can see in his 
defence of the Phenomenology of Perception as well as in Eye and Mind and the lecture courses on 
Nature, a similarly historical path, in that he positions the development of phenomenology within 
a historical framework, which, in the first text, answers to the historical fate of metaphysics and, 
in the second, more specifically, to the “nightmare from which there will be no awakening”, a 
nightmare essentially linked to the reification of the body. 
26 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 272, “Both the contention that there are ‘eternal 
truths’ and the jumbling together of Dasein’s phenomenally grounded ‘ideality’ with an idealized 
absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical 
problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded”.  
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as a historical being. In and through it speaks the historical past of the 
living body.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to develop the horizon for an interpretation of 
Heidegger’s Black Notebooks in order to allow for these to be seen as addressing 
the most pressing questions that humanity is facing today. I tried to do this 
obliquely by means of addressing the various ways by means of which 
interpreters of Heidegger’s work have tried to escape from its difficulty and 
unease. The claim I am making is that in such a way we would be ending up with 
a ‘Heidegger’ bereft of any significance as to the current problems of humankind. 
A ‘Heidegger’ reduced to some ‘productive insights’ from Being and Time would 
give philosophy professors a lot to talk about, but would leave the world 
completely untouched. Instead of analysing his work into bits, might these be 
early or late Heidegger, might these be the ‘properly’ philosophical ideas, 
separated from his own convictions, we need to grasp the whole movement of 
Heidegger’s thinking as one way of thinking, without reducing this to the 
representation of particular claims or views, which he might have held at 
particular stages of his work and which he might have changed over time. In 
order to do so, we need to embark onto the path of thinking as outlined in the 
Black Notebooks. We have already quoted Heidegger’s own reflection on the 
relation between his earlier and his later work, understood as one movement, but 
the problem might become clearer if we look at another passage from the fifth 
volume of the Black Notebooks, clarifying this development in yet another way.  
Above we heard him describe this movement of his work in the following 
ways: 1) “Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II”, 
refering to the point that the whole ‘purpose’ of Heidegger I is to enable us to 
hear Heidegger II. Only once that the metaphysical certainty of our experience 
has been shaken up by putting it into question, can we develop an ear for the 
Question of the History of Being. 2) This distinction is called that between the way 
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of destruction and the Seynsgeschichtliche Auseinandersetzung, that is, the 
historico-critical dis-engagement. 3) And these two parts of his methodology, 
Heidegger calls in his Black Notebooks, “the way of subversion and the way of 
meditation”, as the two ways of reaching an understanding of Geschichte27. To 
understand these in a more essential way, Heidegger clarifies the philosophical 
status of Being and Time as having gone the path of representational thought in a 
‘fundamental ontological’ sense (GA98/43), while it is necessary to understand 
the “sum of my thought” as the “simple step away from representational thought 
to a thinking in motion (a be-wegendes Denken)” (GA98/57). This investigation into 
the way that experience gives itself in the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is therefore 
led back to its historical roots, thereby demonstrating that the truth of the world 
is not what it gives itself as. ‘Our sensations of space and time are false’ as 
Nietzsche said above, and it is this error which Heidegger grounds in what he 
calls ‘the repetition of metaphysics with the aim of its destruction’, aimed at by 
Being and Time. It thus tries to shake up the unhistorical way of experience, by 
leading it back unto its no longer experienced ground. The basic 
misunderstanding of Being and Time thus lies in thinking of it as ‘positive’ 
philosophy, as just saying what is, rather than seeing its ‘destructive’ impetus. 
What, in the end, is Being and Time, if not the attempt to abolish the ‘apparent 
world’, as Nietzsche called for it in “How the True World Finally Became a 
Myth”28?  
And yet, the Schritt zurück, the step backwards, is not to be reduced to the 
fundamental ontological attempt at a repetition of metaphysics with the aim of 
its destruction, that is, with a shift from a description of contemporary Dasein 
towards a reflection on the history that made it possible29, in an interpretation 
 
27 Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938), (GA 94) Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main 2014, p. 442.  
28 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 51. 
29 This is often seen as the idea of the repetition of metaphysics with the aim of its destruction, 
as, for example, in the derivation of the idea of truth as adequatio intellectus et rei to the originary 
notion of truth as aletheia in Being and Time. While this is the step back into the originary 
experience of metaphysics, it does not accomplish the step back to the ‘things themselves’, already 
 Approaching Heidegger’s History of  Being 21 
that is supposed to shake up our experience, but rather concerns a ‘step’ into 
another way of thinking as such. And the claim was that only on account of such 
a change in thinking may we be able to address the problems of Global Warming, 
Globalization, Nihilism and the Nightmare, insofar as these did not follow from 
a mistake in the calculative processes of representational thought, but from the 
establishment of such thought in the age of Enframing (Gestell).  
On the one hand, this critique of technology is well known and one might be 
wondering what the Black Notebooks can add to the understanding of the claim 
that “the essence of technology is itself nothing technological”30. Undoubtedly, 
the reflections of Being and Time and the influence of the later text The Question of 
Technology have had a decisive influence on ecological thinking since the 1970s. 
The questions of world, of care and the concretizations of the understanding of 
the acting human being as Dasein have allowed us to challenge the predominance 
of calculative thinking as it lies at the root of the devastation of our world and 
the spectre of a climate emergency and, finally, its possible catastrophe. We have 
drawn many ideas from these works, but these have been limited by being placed 
within an unquestioned understanding of thinking as the deployment of sets of 
positive, affirmative judgments. We can see this problem in terms of the most 
common reflections on Dasein. This is seen as, for example, an improvement on 
the Kantian idea of transcendental subjectivity and consequently measured 
against this and, therefore, measured in terms of its universal applicability to the 
understanding of human experience. Thus, one asks, ‘who is and who is no 
longer Dasein?’, ‘which are the necessary attributes that determine Dasein? 
Consciousness? A hand? Or, one wonders about the applicability of certain 
attributes to Dasein, like ‘does Dasein have a body?’ or ‘can we apply the idea of 
 
because, as Heidegger claims, the Greeks have not experienced truth in the fullness of aletheia. 
Equally, as has often been argued, there is not yet a full exposition of the phenomenon of ‘world’ 
in Being and Time, which really does not come into its own before the Origin of the Work of Art; see 
“Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, in: Holzwege, pp. 1-72; Engl. trans.: The Origin of the Work of 
Art, in: Poetry, Language, Thought. 
30 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 4, “the essence of technology is by 
no means anything technological”. 
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sexual difference to Dasein?’ etc. etc. And yet, all such questioning ignores not 
only the radical individuation of Dasein, but also the difference between the 
fundamental ontological notion of Dasein in Being and Time, on the one hand, and 
the question of a possible ‘insertion into Da-sein’ (Einsprung in das Da-sein) of a 
thinking in terms of the history of being, on the other hand. And, as Heidegger 
already said above, the sense of the former can be heard only from its inclusion 
in the latter. In other words, Heidegger’s phenomenology is no longer to be 
understood as a method, applying certain techniques to thought, like the 
different layers of Husserl’s epoché, but tries to unearth the historical depth of an 
experience that gives itself in its absolute presence. The thinking of world, of 
ecology, of earth and the belonging of the human being to its world will remain 
meaningless, as long as we refuse to think it in terms of the history of being. This 
refusal becomes the more entrenched as long as we convince ourselves that the 
history of being presents us with abstract ‘grand historical schemes’, while a 
description of everyday experiences would give us concrete insights into 
philosophical questions, especially if enriched by interesting scientific facts. One 
of the main aims of the Black Notebooks lies precisely in overcoming these common 
sense convictions.  
Next to this blindness to history, it is the question of the will and of our 
mastery over nature that make us turn away from Heidegger’s thought. While 
the ecological movement has certainly taken up the critique of human hubris as 
it expresses itself in the scientific worldview, we still ‘will’ to change the human 
approach to the exploitation of nature and, therefore, judge the power of thought 
by the immediacy of its impact, even where we sense the contradiction of such a 
stance. Technology, as Heidegger says, „whose essence is Being itself, is not to be 
overcome by the human being. Because that would presuppose that the human 
being was the master of Being”31.  
The whole problem of thinking, therefore, consists in that thought has no 
longer anything absolute onto which to base itself, while not being able to grant 
 
31 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 38.  
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itself an encompassing ground on its historical becoming. Where Hegel described 
the constant threat of common sense in the separation of thought from the 
alienated world, Heidegger thinks this phenomenon in terms of 
Seinsverlassenheit, which means, essentially withdrawn from the subjective 
volition of the human being. While, therefore, both present the reasons for which 
historical actors ‘do not know what they are doing’, for Heidegger this is a 
problem that our engagement with history cannot be directed to overcome. The 
problem is not only how to think history – difficult enough, once realized that 
history is not a huge storage dump of clear and distinct ideas –, not only because 
thought is never in possession of the thing thought, but also because this lack of 
possession is due already to the idea that thinking is not simultaneous with 
thought (cf. GA 98/121). In opposition to representational thought, Heidegger’s 
thinking in terms of the history of being seems not to bear the promise of being 
able to counter the raging deployment of technology with an assured mastery of 
thought. Reading the Contributions to Philosophy, Mindfulness or The History of 
Beyng, the reader might experience the satisfaction of essential insights alongside 
the feeling that there is nothing we can do. Reading the Black Notebooks should 
help us overcome this feeling of ‘enlightened impotence’.  
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